The financing of artificial intelligence infrastructure is moving from equity to debt, a shift that mirrors the capital structure dynamics that preceded the telecom industry collapse, according to an analysis published by Crunchbase News from David Spreng, founder and co-CEO of Runway Growth Capital. Spreng, a venture capitalist with over 30 years in Silicon Valley, argues that while equity investment in AI reached record highs through 2024 and early 2025, the recent arrival of large-scale borrowing raises questions about whether cash flows will materialize on the timeline that debt repayment demands. The pattern, he writes, resembles the telecom bubble's reliance on demand forecasts that were widely accepted but seldom verified.

Global venture funding totaled $679 billion through the first three quarters of 2026, the highest figure ever recorded for that nine-month span, according to Crunchbase data cited in the report. AI companies alone attracted $102 billion in the third quarter of 2026, representing roughly 64% of worldwide venture funding during those three months. A record 27 companies raised financing rounds of $1 billion or more in the quarter, collectively accounting for about one-third of that total. Meta sold $30 billion in bonds last October in one of the largest corporate debt offerings on record, then returned for $25 billion more in April, with investors reportedly demanding higher compensation the second time. Amazon, Alphabet, and Oracle have each borrowed tens of billions, and Meta's Louisiana data-center project was financed with a record $27 billion bond raised by a joint-venture partner rather than by Meta itself. Morgan Stanley projects the major AI and cloud companies will spend approximately $3 trillion on infrastructure through 2028, with only about half expected to come from their own cash flow.

The demand narrative driving today's buildout holds that data centers are effectively leased before construction and that the only real error is building too little, Spreng writes, but the forecast is repeated with the same uniformity that the telecom industry's traffic projection enjoyed in 1999. That earlier claim held that internet traffic was doubling every 100 days, when it was actually doubling about once a year—spectacular growth but a fraction of what the borrowing assumed. By 2002, the telecom sector carried roughly $1 trillion in debt, much of which the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission told Congress would never be repaid, and WorldCom had entered what was then the largest bankruptcy in American history. "What has changed in recent months is that investors have begun demanding an answer," Spreng writes, noting that once companies of Anthropic's scale report financial results every quarter, investors can check the demand story against audited numbers.

The core concern, according to Spreng, is whether revenue arrives on the schedule that debt obligations require. Equity financing imposes no fixed repayment deadlines and allows investors to absorb losses through declining valuations while companies retain flexibility to pursue long-term strategies, he explains. Debt, by contrast, demands cash on a fixed timetable, and when borrowed capital builds capacity faster than revenue arrives to service it, the correction tends to come through restructurings rather than quiet markdowns. Some may argue the comparison fails because the companies doing the largest borrowing are among the most profitable enterprises ever built, with cash flows the telecom carriers never approached, Spreng acknowledges. A few AI companies also appear to be reaching revenue scale faster than any businesses before them, and the internet really did change everything, just as the traffic really did arrive. "All of that may be true, and none of it answers the question I think a lender has to ask," he writes.

The most durable lesson of the telecom bust concerned capital structure, which decided who remained standing when demand finally caught up with capacity, long after the technology itself had been vindicated, Spreng concludes. Debt serves borrowers whose obligations are sized to revenue they can see and lenders who underwrite fundamentals instead of narratives, he argues, and it treats everyone else harshly. "I believe the borrowing stacked beneath the AI boom will be judged by that standard," he writes. Every assumption may well hold, but once investors begin asking what supports the foundation, they rarely stop until they reach something solid. The piece functions less as a prediction of collapse than as a reminder that the speed of capital deployment and the structure of its financing will determine which companies survive if revenue growth disappoints. For executives weighing large infrastructure commitments, the choice between patient equity and demanding debt may prove more consequential than the technology bets themselves.